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I. INTRODUCTION
The current law regarding whether a company can be held
vicariously liable for the torts of independent contractors is a morass.
Companies do not know in what circumstances liability will attach.
Uncertainty and inconsistency are rife and well documented. / As the
use of outsourcing continues to increase in the United States, an accurate
assessment of the potential liability risks associated with independent
contractors has become even more important. Companies in the United
States are increasingly using independent contractors who are based
overseas to perform a wide variety of functions, including not only
customer service "call centers," but also medical services, such as
radiology and medical imaging diagnostics.3 More than ever, the law of
vicarious liability needs to be predictable so that companies can make
informed operational choices about who they hire. Companies should
know what liability risks they reasonably face-both to assess whether
the benefits of an undertaking outweigh the costs, and, more pointedly,
to assess whether to use independent contractors rather than hire their
own employees, over whom they have the greatest control. Currently,
business choices simply fall hazard to guesswork, or worse, 'inflated
2. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees
One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 335
nn.244-46 (2001) (collecting cases demonstrating the unpredictability in the current
"multi-factor" test of employee status which is used to determine whether to attach
vicarious liability); Joseph H. King, Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for
the Torts of Their Franchisees, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 417, 462 (2005) (criticizing
current "ad hoc approach to the question of vicarious liability with all of the
imponderability and unpredictability that currently plagues the area."). See Richardson
v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So. 2d 143, 150 (Miss. 1994) ("[T]he various tests to
determine the type of relationship are themselves generalities which can be viewed
quite differently, depending upon which judge is applying them."); Burns v. Labor &
Indus. Relations Comm'n, 845 S.W.2d 553, 556-67 (Mo. 1993) (noting that the worker
in question, a roofer, could be an employee even if the approximately thirty other fellow
roofers hired by the same employer were independent contractors, because there were at
least some facts unique to that particular roofer."); Harger v. Structural Serv., Inc., 916
P.2d 1324, 1334 (N.M. 1996) ("A fact found controlling in one combination may have a
minor importance in another."); Engel v. Calgon Corp., 498 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878-79
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (finding that one agency's determination that worker was
employee under one state law did not preclude another agency from determining that
worker was independent contractor under another state law).
3. Amy Spreeman, Overnight Readings, MARKETPLACE MAG., May 16, 2007, at
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risk assessment,' resulting from a conclusion that there is always a risk
that a company will be held liable for the acts of independent
contractors, regardless of the circumstances.
This Article evaluates when, if at all, it is appropriate to hold
companies that hire independent contractors liable for the acts of those
independent contractors. Part II provides background regarding the
current state of the law of vicarious liability, including its historical
underpinnings, and the factors that contribute to unpredictability. Part
III analyzes and critiques alternative theoretical models that scholars
have advanced to address the problems in the current law. Scholars
contend that a desirable model of liability is one that serves the oft-
stated "twin" goals of tort law: deterrence and compensation. 4  An
important addition to these goals, however, which many scholars seem
to overlook, is that tort law should also improve - or at least not hinder -
economic efficiency. The current system of vicarious liability, as well
as the proposals that have been advanced by scholars, do a poor job of
advancing all three goals. Part IV of this Article advances an alternative
theory called "Contract Preemption." Under this theory, torts are divid-
ed into two categories - those involving injury to a third party that
entered into a contract relationship with the independent contractor and
was ultimately injured, and those torts involving injury to a third party
that has no privity with either the independent contractor or the company
that hired the independent contractor.
This Article's primary thesis is that the model of tort liability
necessarily should be different in these two very different constructs.
The current vicarious liability model, as well as the alternative theories
that have been advanced by scholars, have made no distinction between
these two categories of torts because their focus is solely on the
relationship between the company that hired the independent contractor,
and the independent contractor. That relationship, while important,
should not be the sole focus. Any model of tort liability should also
consider the relationship between the independent contractor and the
third party that is ultimately injured by the independent contractor.
Under the Contract Preemption theory, parties who are injured in the
first category of torts, where there is a contract relationship, should be
limited to seeking recovery for their injuries from the independent
contractor, but subject to one condition - the tort victim must have had
4. See Grube v. Thiel, 496 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing compen-
sation and deterrence as primary goals of tort law).
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clear notice that he or she was entering into a contract with an
independent contractor. So long as the victim had clear notice, no vicar-
ious liability can attach to the company that hired the independent con-
tractor. In this circumstance, contract effectively preempts tort remedies
by cutting off tort recovery where there is privity between the tort victim
and the independent contractor. If there is no notice to the tort victim
that the company is in fact an independent contractor, then the model of
liability should be the same as in the second category of torts.
In the second category of torts which involves injuries to third
parties that enjoy no contractual relationship with either the independent
contractor or the hiring company, the actual tortfeasor should still bear
primary liability. If the independent contractor has insufficient assets,
however, then the company that hired the independent contractors
should bear the burden of making up the shortfall. The liability should
not be uncertain, as it is today. Rather, there should be liability, but only
secondary liability. In this second category of torts, contract still has an
important role to play between the hiring company and the independent
contractor. If the risks of injury by the independent contractor are high,
but its assets are low, the hiring company can require, in its contract
with the independent contractor, that the contractor obtain requisite
levels of insurance. In this way, the company can use contract law to
limit its tort liability - another variant of the theory of contract pre-
empting tort liability.
This Article concludes that the Contract Preemption theory of
vicarious liability is superior to both the current vicarious liability model
and the alternative models advanced by scholars because the twin goals
of tort law, deterrence and compensation, are better achieved with
significantly less compromise to economic efficiency.
II. BACKGROUND REGARDING THE LAW OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The doctrine of vicarious liability traces its roots to the theory of
"respondeat superior," or "Let the Master Answer."5 This maxim holds
that the "master" is liable for the acts of his "servants," even if the
master is not at fault. Thus, from the vantage point of the "master,"
5. See Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 138 (Alaska 1972) (stating that
respondeat superior means "let the employer answer"); Richard Fossey & Todd A.
Demitchell, "Let the Master Answer": Holding Schools Vicariously Liable When
Employees Sexually Abuse Children, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 575 (1996).
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respondeat superior liability is a form of strict liability because the
master is being held liable even though the master has done no wrong.6
Instead, the tort of another party is imputed to the master. In a wider
sense, however, vicarious liability is clearly distinguishable from strict
liability because vicarious liability does depend on establishing the fault
or negligence of at least one party: the servant.7 Vicarious liability is
defined as "liability for the tort of another person."8
In the pre-industrial era, there was little need to classify a worker as
either a servant or an "independent contractor" because most of the work
was domestic in nature, and the servant was typically tied to a particular
household. In those circumstances, there was no doubt that the servant
was employed by the master/owner of the household. If the servant
injured someone, the master would bear financial responsibility. 9 With
industrialization, however, the classification of workers became more
important. Parties needed to know who would be held responsible for
injuries caused by a worker. Even before industrialization, there were
some workers who were not tied exclusively to one employer and who
acted as their own "masters," akin to modem day independent
contractors. 10
Some courts initially imposed liability on whoever paid for the
work, even if that person had no control over the worker (i.e., even
though the worker would be classified as an independent contractor in
modem times). " Ironically, this is the very model of liability that is
advanced by "Enterprise Liability" theorists today, some 150 years later,
as will be discussed infra. In the 1800s, however, courts moved away
from and ultimately rejected this "payment responsibility" model,
concluding that it was unfair to hold a company liable for the acts of
another party over whom the company could exercise no control. The
courts instead tumed to a model that focused on the employer's
"control" or "right to control" the worker. ' 2
6. Charles E. Cantu, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability in Tort from
Strict Products Liability: Medusa Unveiled, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 823, 856 (2003).
7. The one exception is that liability is sometimes imputed when the servant is
strictly liable, without fault by the servant.
8. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 905 (2000).
9. Carlson, supra note 2, at 302-03.
10. Id. at 303.
11. Id. at 304.
12. Id.
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A. Vicarious Liability was Initially Limited to the Acts of Workers Over
Whom the Company Had Control or the Right to Exercise Control
Under the "control" test, if the master had the right to supervise the
work, the master was held liable for the negligence of the worker. If the
master did not have the ability to supervise or "control" the work, no
liability would attach. 13 This model was consistent with the system of
fault-based liability that is generally favored in the United States. 14
Instead of imposing "strict liability" for the torts of another party,
liability of the master was considered appropriate because the employer
was deemed to have either failed to supervise the work, or negligently
selected the worker. 15
Under this vicarious liability model, companies were liable for the
acts of their employees, over whom they could exercise "control" in the
traditional sense of a master/servant relationship. By extension, courts
believed it was appropriate that if a company exerted the same kind of
control over a "contractor" as it did over one of its employees, liability
should attach for the injuries caused by those workers. 16 For reasons
that are discussed infra, "control" is not the proper proxy for
determining whether to impose vicarious liability. Indeed, courts moved
away from a "control" approach because the simplicity of that test fell
short when applied in a modem industrial and commercial setting. In
some contexts, courts noted that highly skilled workers were effectively
"beyond the control" of the employer because of their specialized
knowledge, which the employer had little understanding or ability to
supervise.
13. Id.
14. See Cantu, supra note 6, at 827.
15. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 304.
16. See McKee v. Brimmer, 39 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that "an
employer will not be allowed to escape liability by drafting a contract which labels its
employee an independent contractor, but retains employer-like control over him");
Hederman v. Cox, 193 So. 19, 24 (Miss. 1940) ("The examining court must 'pierce
through the screen of technical attitudes to what are the realities, and must regard
substance rather than formal similitudes."'); Deanne M. Mosley & William C. Walter,
The Significance of the Classification of Employment Relationships in Determining
Exposure to Liability, 67 Miss. L.J. 613, 626 & nn.44-45 (1998) (citing Gulf Ref g Co.
v. Nations, 145 So. 327, 333 (Miss. 1933)).
17. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 305.
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B. Courts Abandoned the Unitary "Control Test" in Favor of a Multi-
Factor "Status " Test to Determine Whether the Worker was an
Employee or an Independent Contractor.
By the late 1800s, courts had added many factors to the list of
things to consider when evaluating whether a worker was an "employee"
in which vicarious liability would be appropriate, or an "independent
contractor," in which vicarious liability would not be appropriate.
Whether the employer could exercise "control" over the worker was
often an important, but not an exclusive, factor. 18  This multi-factor
approach is reflected in Section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, which lists the following ten factors in evaluating whether a
worker is an employee or an independent contractor:
(a) the extent of control which, by agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in a particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools and the place of work for the person doing
the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job;
(h) whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether the parties believed they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in the business. 19
In addition to the ten factors set forth in the Restatement of Agency,
some courts consider additional factors, including whether the employer
has a right to terminate the relationship (such a right implies greater
control), whether there is freedom to serve other employers, whether the
worker has employees, and the 'economic realities' test, which looks to
the overall dependence of the worker on the employer, with more
dependence suggesting the employer has greater control.20 In 1992, the
18. Id. at 310.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
20. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 338-54.
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U.S. Supreme Court applied a multi-factor test in Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden to determine whether insurance agents qualified as
independent contractors.2 ' In Darden, the Supreme Court instructed that
all of the factors "must be assessed and weighed with no one factor
being decisive., 2 2 Courts currently rely on this multi-factor "status" test
to initially ascertain a worker's employee/independent contractor status,
which determines whether the company that hired the worker will bear
liability for that worker's torts.23
C. Vicarious Liability for the Acts of Employees is Unpredictable
Because the Status of Workers is Indeterminate.
There are multiple causes for vicarious liability law's
unpredictability, but a primary one is that the threshold determination of
whether the tortfeasor will be deemed to be an employee or an
independent contractor is itself unpredictable and fairly arbitrary.
Indeed, courts actually only give the slightest regard to the labels that
the parties attach to their dealings.24 Even if the contract executed by
the company expressly states that the other party is an independent
contractor, and not an employee, the courts disregard the parties'
"contract label" in favor of an analysis of the nature of the "actual"
relationship between the parties.25 Courts feared employers would
manipulate "labels" to try to avoid liability for their own employees'
acts. If the "actual" relationship is akin to that of an employee/employer
relationship, the Courts will hold the hiring company liable for the acts
of that person as a de facto employee. While that result may seem
appropriate, using a multi-factor "status" test has many drawbacks.
Further, the court's paternalistic impulse to "watchdog" companies is
21. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992).
22. Id.
23. Id.; Brown v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 733 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1984) (focusing on
whether contractor's work is part of "trade or business" of principal for purposes of
evaluating whether worker is independent contractor or employee).
24. See Mosley & Walter, supra note 16, at 625-26; see also McKee v. Brimmer,
39 F.3d 94 (5th Cir. 1994); Hederman v. Cox, 193 So. 19 (Miss. 1940).
25. Id. at 625 & n.45 (quoting Hederman v. Cox, 193 So. 19, 24 (Miss. 1940)
(stating that the "court must pierce through the screen of technical attitudes to what are
the realities, and must regard substance rather than formal similitudes") ("The court will
look beyond the contract to see whether the classification contracted to is the
employment relationship that actually exists.")).
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misplaced. As demonstrated in Part IV of this Article, straightforward
economics is a better driver for determining when liability is
appropriate.
One drawback of the multi-factor "status" test is that the constant
addition of factors which must be considered contributes to the lack of
predictability in the outcome.26 In practice, court determinations of
whether there is an "actual" employee relationship using the multi-factor
"status" tests have been fairly arbitrary. The outcome in any particular
case depends on the importance that the court attaches to any one factor.
Just "slight changes in circumstances," or "slight variations in a court's
statement of the test, can shift an individual from one status to
another., 27 As a result, in seemingly similar circumstances, courts have
reached opposite determinations, even after supposedly applying the
same multi-factor test.28
Another criticism of the multi-factor "status" test is that many of
the factors have no bearing on whether the worker is an employee or an
independent contractor, or on whether vicarious liability is appropriate.
As an example, one factor that courts consider is the length of time
which the person has been employed by the company. Even if the rela-
tionship between the parties is long term, this fact does not bear on
whether the worker is an employee. Independent contractors can have
long-standing contracts without being employees and without any
"control" being exercised over their work.
Courts also consider consider whether the work is part of the
"regular" business of the employer. An evaluation of this factor, how-
ever, depends on how the business is defined. If the business is defined
as "manufacturing," then salespeople who distribute the product may not
be considered as part of the "regular" business. In contrast, if the busi-
ness is vertically integrated, distribution may be included as part of the
company's "regular" business so that sales representatives would
properly qualify as employees.
26. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 309; see also King, supra note 2, at 462
(criticizing current "ad hoc approach to the question of vicarious liability with all of the
imponderability and unpredictability that currently plagues the area"); see also
Richardson v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So. 2d 143 (Miss. 1994); Bums v. Labor &
Indus. Relations Comm'n, 845 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1993); Harger v. Structural Serv., Inc.,
916 P.2d 1324 (N.M. 1996); Engel v. Calgon Corp., 498 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986).
27. See supra note 2 (listing Journal articles and cases).
28. Id.
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D. The Multi-Factor "Status " Test is Results Driven.
The problems that beset the current multi-factor test are exacerbated
because the outcome of the employee status determination is often
"results driven." This is because of a completely unrelated devel-
opment: the passage of social welfare legislation aimed at improving
working conditions. Starting in the late 1800s, states began passing
wage and hour's laws restricting, for example, the number of hours that
could be worked without employers paying overtime. The
contemporary "successor" to these early laws is the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which imposes minimum wage requirements and
overtime payments based on number of hours worked, among other
requirements. 29  Another modem development was the passage of
workers compensation laws, which were designed to ensure protection
of the employee in the event of injury using a "no fault" system of lia-
bility. Workers compensation laws provided that, regardless of whether
the employee had any fault in the injury, the employee was entitled to
recover statutorily determined damages. In 1964, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act established protections to prevent gender or racial discrim-
ination.3 ° Thereafter, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and
Americans with Disabilities Act were passed.31
The significance of these social welfare laws in the unrelated
context of vicarious liability is that employee status directly bears on
whether workers will be eligible for these statutory protections. 32 Most
of these laws extend their scope to "employees" only, making the
29. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
30. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et
seq. (2006)).
31. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(a) (2006).
32. Jane M. McFetridge & Grace Hwang Lee, When Are Supervisors Personally
Liable for Employment Law Violations?, 92 ILL. B.J. 628 (2004); Danielle Tarantolo,
Note, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the
Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170 (2006); see MacLachlan v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 350 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that status as employee or
independent contractor determines eligibility for ERISA benefits as well as tax
treatment); Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage Inc., 237 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
2000) (holding that worker was "employee," rather than independent contractor and
therefore was entitled to protections of Title VII); Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d
337 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that Title VII did not apply because worker was
independent contractor).
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determination of employee status critical to establishing eligibility for
statutory coverage.33 When faced with the question of whether to
extend these statutory protections to workers, courts often "stretch" in
applying the various factors to find employee status.3 t The precedent
established by reaching a determination of "employee" status for that
purpose necessarily leaves companies exposed to vicarious tort
liability.35
Another, different, "results driven" aspect results because tax
authorities are keenly interested in establishing employee status to
determine the employer's obligations for payroll taxes and income tax
withholding.
36
It is therefore unsurprising that there is such unpredictability in the
law of vicarious liability: the threshold determination of whether the
tortfeasor will be deemed an employee or independent contractor is itself
unpredictable, rather arbitrary, and results-driven.
If that were not enough, there is yet another set of factors that
contributes to the unpredictability. Even when courts determine that a
worker 'truly' is an independent contractor, the courts sometimes never-
theless impose vicarious liability for the acts of independent contractors.
Courts have developed numerous "exceptions" to the "general rule" that
employers should not be held vicariously liable for the acts of
independent contractors. Indeed, this area of the law is a quintessential
example of exceptions to the "general rule" effectively swallowing the
rule altogether.37
33. See supra notes 29-31.
34. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 311 ("Courts were frequently inclined to give
added weight to factors other than control when the effect was to extend protection to
needy workers rather than to impose tort liability on employers.").
35. Clement L. Hyland & Laura A. Quigley, Determination of Employee Status
Right to Control v. Economic Reality-Is There a Difference?, 61(1) FLA. B.J. 43
(1987).
36. Air Terminal Cab, Inc. v. United States, 478 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1973)
(reviewing factors, including right to control, to establish whether worker was employee
for tax purposes); Ware v. United States, 67 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); Jeff
Alden, Hiring the Independent Contractor, 60(3) BENCH & B. MINN. 21 (2003); Laura
A. Quigley, Cost Increases for Misclassifying a Worker as an Independent Contractor,
16 TAX'N FOR LAW 140 (1987).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409, cmt. b (1965); Farris v. Gen. Growth
Dev. Corp., 354 N.W.2d 251 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Haufle v. Svoboda, 416 N.W.2d
879 (S.D. 1987) (applying exception to general rule of nonliability for acts of
independent contractor).
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E. Exceptions Swallow the "General Rule" of
Nonliability for Acts of Independent Contractors.
There are four major exceptions to the "general rule" that a
company will not be held liable for the acts of independent contractors:
(1) inherently dangerous activity; (2) non-delegable duties; (3) retained
control; and (4) apparent agency.38 As discussed below, there appears to
be no principled rationale for application of any of these exceptions,
aside from the "apparent agency" exception. The other exceptions
appear to reflect a results-driven determination that the injured party
should be able to seek redress from the company that hired the
independent contractor. While compensation is an important goal of tort
law, it is not the only goal. So long as the hiring company exercised due
care in selecting the independent contractor, none of these blanket ex-
ceptions, aside from the "apparent agency" doctrine, should apply.
1. Inherently Dangerous Activity.
Under the "inherently dangerous activity" exception, a company
seeking to carry out an "inherently or intrinsically dangerous activity"
will be liable for harm resulting from that activity, regardless of who
undertakes the activity-whether it is an employee, or an independent
contractor.39 The rationale for this exception is that because the activity
is inherently dangerous, the activity is "tolerated only if the public is
38. See King, supra note 2, at 438; Mary M. McEachem, Note, Inherently
Dangerous or Inherently Difficult? Interpretations and Criticisms of Imposing
Vicarious Liability on General Contractors for Injuries Suffered as a Result of Work
Performed by Independent Contractors, 17 CAMPBELL L. REv. 483 (1995).
39. Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, 325 A.2d 432 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (discussing
exception to rule of nonliability for acts of independent contractors); Rowley v.
Baltimore, 484 A.2d 306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984), affid, 505 A.2d 494 (Md. 1986)
(same); Bartholomew v. CNG Producing Co., 832 F. 2d 326 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that principal will be held liable for acts of independent contractor in connection with
ultrahazardous activity); Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604
(La. Ct. App. 1979) (same); Williams v. Gervais F. Favrot Co., 499 So. 2d 623 (La. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that construction work was not inherently dangerous and therefore
company was not liable for acts of independent contractor); Hawkins v. Evans
Cooperate Co., 766 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that manufacturer was not liable
for negligence of independent contractor who shipped goods because shipping was not
inherently dangerous activity).
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protected in the event of injury. 4 ° Under § 416 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, a company that uses an independent contractor to do
work that the company knows is likely to create harm to others unless
necessary precautions are taken is liable for harm caused by the failure
of the independent contractor to take the necessary precautions, even if
the contract with the independent contractor mandates that the contractor
take such steps.4'
The problem with this exception to the "general rule" of
nonliability is similar to the problem that affects Enterprise Liability
theory, discussed infra. By holding a company liable for acts of inde-
pendent contractors, even though the company has less control over their
actions, the "inherently dangerous" activity exception, like Enterprise
Liability, may disincentivize the use of independent contractors. If
liability is imposed regardless of whether the activity is undertaken by
employees or by independent contractors, a company may be incen-
tivized to use its own employees, over whom it has the most control.
Perhaps this is the result that the courts seek because they believe that
greater safety will be achieved. That conclusion does not necessarily
follow, however. Independent contractors may specialize in undertaking
the very activity that is risky and may well be better at the job than the
company's own employees. By burdening the choice of which type of
worker to use, the most efficient use of resources may be dampened.
In fact, if the independent contractor has lower rates of injury
relative to the company's own employees because the contractor
specializes in the particular field, the disincentive to use independent
contractors may be overcome. This presumes, however, that market
information is readily available. Absent solid data, if a company knows
it will be held liable for the acts of independent contractors to the same
extent as employees, the company may rationally favor using its own
employees, over whom it has control, relative to using contractors over
whom it has little control. The greater the potential liability risk, the
stronger the disincentive may be to using independent contractors.
42
A surprising example of this is the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez
40. James Lockhart, Cause of Action Against Employer for Negligence of
Independent Contractor Engaged in "Inherently Dangerous" Activity, 11 CAUSES OF
ACTION 393, § 2 (2008).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965); see also 41 AM. JUR. 2D
Independent Contractors § 52 (2009); Lockhart, supra note 40 at § 2.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1965).
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disaster. When legislation was passed subjecting companies to un-
limited liability for oil spills, commentators speculated that shipping
would be relegated to wildcat and reckless independent contractors.43
Instead, many of the major oil companies expanded into the shipping
business, hiring their own employees because even the possibility of
vicarious liability was deemed too high a risk to delegate the work to
others, over whom the oil companies had less control. 44 While leg-
islators may conclude that this was the right result, it may well be that
oil companies should concentrate on that aspect of their business that
they do best, drilling for oil, instead of also going into the shipping
business. Those business interests that initially led companies to use
independent contractors were superseded by the prospect of even
potential vicarious liability for the acts of independent contractors.
One way the company may seek to overcome this disincentive is to
obtain a full indemnity from the independent contractor for any liability
that may result from the independent contractor's activities. Even in this
circumstance, however, the disincentive may not be fully overcome
because an indemnity necessarily adds additional risk, depending on
whether the independent contractor has sufficient assets, not only at the
time the parties execute the agreement, but for the duration of the
contract. If the independent contractor can obtain insurance, this may do
a better job in reducing the disincentive to use independent contractors.
In practice, however, even insurance is subject to many exclusions,
making its application far from a foregone conclusion. Further, insur-
ance may be unavailable as a practical matter.
The stated purpose of the "inherently dangerous activity" exception
is to ensure that victims are compensated for their injuries. Innocent
third parties should not have to bear the loss relative to the company that
hired the contractor to perform the activity that made the injury possible.
This compensation goal makes sense, at least as to "innocent" third
parties, but it may be achieved without the loss of economic efficiency
that results from the current model of liability, as will be discussed infra.
2. Nondelegable Duty.
Another exception to the "general rule" of nonliability is the
43. Richard R.W. Brooks, Liability and Organizational Choice, 45 J.L. & ECON.
91, 92 (2002).
44. Id. at 93.
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amorphous non-delegable duty exception, which holds that liability for
some undertakings cannot be delegated to others. This vague exception
applies to duties that are said to be owed to the public generally.45 An
example is if the company is required by statute or regulation to provide
certain safeguards. If the independent contractor fails to abide by such
safeguards, the company that hired the independent contractor may be
held liable for the resulting injury, even if the company mandated as a
matter of contract that the contractor undertake the particular safe-
guards.46 This resembles the "inherently dangerous activity" exception,
except that it is broader in applying not just to "high risk" activities, but
to any activity which is regulated or which is believed to impact the
public generally.47
The rationale for this common-law exception appears to reflect a
determination that liability for a regulated or "public risk" should not be
delegated, even though, in the case of regulated risk, the legislature that
established the statutory or regulatory framework could presumably
have imposed such restrictions itself, and did not do so. If the leg-
islature wishes to require certification or licensing before undertaking a
given task, the legislature can bar delegation to non-licensed parties or
require all parties involved to have their own certification.
It is unclear why regulatory duties or duties owed to the public at
large and the liability risks attendant to those duties should not be
delegated to others who may well have greater expertise in a particular
area. From the common law perspective, having a source of "deeper
45. See Lockhart, supra note 40, at § 3; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 409, cmt. b (1965); Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 827 P.2d 102 (N.M. 1992) (holding that
company had non-delegable duty to ensure precautions were taken in connection with
high voltage system and therefore company was liable for negligence of independent
contractor who installed fence too close to high voltage wire, resulting in death of
student).
46. See Herbst v. Bothof Dairies, Inc., 719 P.2d 1231 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986)
(principal, which undertook performance of cattle leases, had a non-delegable duty, to
exercise adequate care and thus could be held liable for agent's failure to provide
adequate care); Rietze v. Williams, 458 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1970) (imposing vicarious
liability on hiring company); Griffith v. George Transfer & Rigging, Inc., 201 S.E.2d
281 (W. Va. 1973) (holding that public policy requires truck owners holding certificates
from the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") be held liable for negligent
operation of their trucks, even if operators were independent contractors because
potential for liability serves to enforce compliance with ICC safety regulations); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965).
47. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 432 (2009).
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pockets" may be deemed more important in a regulatory context,
although this conclusion may not follow because the independent
contractor need not be a solo entity that has fewer resources.
Alternatively, courts may believe that safety or regulatory compliance
will be better achieved by holding the hiring company liable. 4s If, how-
ever, better safety, compliance, or compensation for injuries are the
goals, these goals can be better achieved by imposing liability directly
on the independent contractor, and only secondarily on the company that
hired the independent contractor, if the independent contractor's assets
are insufficient. 49 The independent contractor will have the greatest
incentive to take due care if it is held directly liable. The hiring com-
pany already has sufficient incentive because it can be held directly
liable if it fails to exercise due care in selecting the contractor. 50
Holding it vicariously liable for the acts of the independent contractor
does not accomplish any further 'due care,' because the company is not
in a position to exercise that care.5' Further, effectively imposing
liability risk on both parties increases the risk unnecessarily to the hiring
company, as well as increasing the costs of insurance for one or both of
the parties even though the independent contractor may well have
sufficient assets to satisfy the loss.
The "non-delegable" duty exception to the "general rule" of
nonliability is a rather amorphous exception that does not appear to
advance the goals of deterrence, compensation or economic efficiency.
3. Retained Control.
Another exception to the "general rule" of nonliability is the
"retained control" exception. This exception holds that if a company
retains "too much" control over an independent contractor, vicarious
liability will be imposed on the company.52 This exception is unpre-
48. See generally 34 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 3 (2009).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See generally David M. Herszenhorn, Stimulus Plan Ensures Boom Sector:
Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A18 (discussing the difficulty of supervising
independent contractors).
52. See Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, 347 F.3d 72 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that parent
company would not be liable for acts of subsidiary unless it directed subsidiary's
complained of discriminatory act); Wallace v. Oceaneering Int'l, 727 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.
1984) (holding that defendant company did not retain operational control and therefore
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dictable because it is difficult to measure the level of "control" that is
being exerted, let alone to predict ahead of time how much control will
be considered "too much," and therefore trigger vicarious liability. The
application of this exception is often tied to the threshold determination
of whether the worker is deemed a de facto employee.53 Where the
company exercises significant control, courts conclude that the actual
relationship is more akin to that of an employee in which vicarious
liability is appropriate.54 Another view of the "retained control" excep-
tion is that it does not impose vicarious liability, but rather direct
liability for having negligently exercised control over the contractor.55
Certainly, when the hiring company exercises control, and as a re-
sult of that control, someone is injured, it should be held liable, but in
that circumstance, it should be held directly liable, for its own
negligence, as opposed to being held vicariously liable for the inde-
pendent contractor's negligence.5 6 In this sense, the "retained control"
exception makes sense, not as a means for imposing vicarious liability,
but rather direct liability. This is a more predictable application of the
rule because liability will only be imposed on the hiring company if it
has exercised control over the particular acts of the independent
contractor that caused the injury. The guesswork regarding "control" in
the abstract will be eliminated. The issue will not be whether the hiring
company has exercised control generally or whether it has the right to do
so, but rather whether a specific mandate or protocol required by the
hiring company caused the injury.57 Deterrence goals are not advanced
by imposing liability on the hiring company over areas where the hiring
company has not in fact exercised control.
One may question whether imposing liability on the hiring
was not liable for acts of independent contractors).
53. See, e.g., 44 TEX. JUR. 3D Independent Contractors § 7 (2009).
54. See id.
55. Robert Michael Ey, Cause of Action Against Employer of Independent
Contractor To Establish Liability Based on Retained Control of Contractor's Work, 8
CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 859, § 1 (2007).
56. See Pac. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 277 N.W. 226, 228 (Minn.
1937) (holding that although a contractor delegates performance to an independent
contractor, a duty of due care still exists that may subject the contractor to liability for
harm caused by the subcontractor).
57. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965) (discussing an
employer's obligation to take certain safety precautions when hiring independent
contractors).
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company would incentivize the company to exert more control over the
operations of the independent contractor that pose risk and thereby
improve safety. First, as a practical matter, it may not be possible for
the hiring company to exert control over an independent contractor's
business.58 Second, the hiring company may be less competent in the
particular area as the independent contractor. Incentivizing the wrong
company will actually decrease safety. Third, and particularly prob-
lematic, there are other legal constraints in our current legal system that
could effectively counteract any positive incentives that would result
from imposing vicarious liability over the hiring company. Under the
current law,5 9 "control" is a key factor that is used to determine
employee "status," not only for imposing vicarious tort liability, but also
for purposes of assessing whether the company will be liable for
employee payroll taxes, income tax withholding, wage and hours law
regulations, and the host of federal anti-discrimination laws. Indeed, our
current system ironically disincentivizes companies from exercising
control over safety and standards because that may jeopardize
independent contractor status, thereby potentially subjecting the
company to a host of social welfare laws and tax laws. Thus, even if the
model of tort liability was changed to incentivize the exercise of control
by the hiring company, this "incentive" to exercising control may be
insufficient to overcome the many other disincentives that exist to
exercising control.
4. Apparent Agency.
The apparent agency exception holds that where an agent has
"apparent authority" to bind a principal, and a third party justifiably
relies upon such agency, the principal will be held liable for the acts of
the apparent agent, even if that agent is actually an independent con-
tractor. Significantly, apparent agency requires some act on the part of
58. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
60. See Carris v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 466 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
apparent authority exception to respondeat superior under Bahamian law was not
against public policy); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. U.S. Trust Co., 397 F.3d 577 (7th Cir.
2005) (holding that there was no conduct by principal that could serve to justify
apparent authority theory of liability); Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156 (4th
Cir. 1988) (holding hotel liable under apparent authority exception because there was
no notice that hotel was independently owned, except in restaurant, where guest did not
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the principal that manifests the agency role, which causes the third party
to reasonably believe that the person is an agent of the principal. 6  That
"manifestation" can be direct 62 or indirect 63 communications, potentially
including advertisements that lead the third party to believe that the
agent is acting on the principal's behalf.64 Apparent agency is some-
times referred to as 'agency by estoppel': the principal is estopped from
denying the relationship based on the reasonable reliance of a third party
on the acts of the principal. 65 Both the Restatement of Agency and Torts
set forth "apparent agency" or "apparent authority" as a basis for
imposing vicarious liability.
66
This is the only sensible exception to the general rule of nonliability
for acts of independent contractors. If the buyers of a product or service
reasonably believe they are buying the product or service from an
employee or direct agent of the company as a result of actions that were
taken by the company itself, the company should be held liable. This is
equitable because the business may be "aided in accomplishing the tort
by the existence of the agency relation., 67 Certainly when it comes to
enter); Espalin v. Children's Med. Ctr., 27 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding that
hospital was not liable for negligence of independent contractor physicians because
patients signed disclosures that notified patients of independent contractor status).
61. Espalin, 27 S.W.3d at 684.
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958) (defining apparent
authority).
63. See id
64. See, e.g., Sarkes Tarzian, Inc., 397 F.3d at 586; Carris, 466 F.3d at 560.
65. See Paula J. Dailey, All in a Day's Work: Employers' Vicarious Liability for
Sexual Harassment, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 517, 543 (2002) (describing vicarious liability
by estoppel).
66. Adam Alstott, Hospital Liability for Negligence of Independent Contractor
Physicians Under Principles of Apparent Agency, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 485, 487-88 (2004)
(discussing apparent agency as it relates to vicarious liability). See Mehiman v. Powell,
378 A.2d 1121 (Md. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958) ("One
who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third
person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to
liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one
appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 429 (1965) ("One who employs an independent contractor to perform
services for another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are
being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the same
extent as though the employer were supplying them himself or by his servants.").
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 216, cmt. a (1958).
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business, the reasonable expectations of the consumer should and do
matter. Notably, this exception only applies to torts that arise where
there is a contracting relationship between the independent contractor
and consumer since that is the only context in which an agency
relationship can arise. The purpose of this exception is not related so
much to advancing the general goals of tort law, namely compensating
tort victims and deterring harm, so much as advancing general equitable
considerations based on traditional contract and reliance principles.
The difficulty with the agency exception has been determining what
acts of the principal should be deemed sufficient to estop the principal
from denying an agency relationship. Here, the law would benefit from
a bright line test. Rather than attempt to define what conduct may be
sufficient to manifest an agency relationship, the independent contractor
should have an affirmative duty to prevent any misimpression by
disclosing that the independent contractor is not an employee or
representative of the company, but instead is completely independent.
The independent contractor should be contractually required by the
principal to inform the consumer that the independent contractor will be
responsible for any problems and that sole recourse will lie with the
contractor, except for problems relating to defects in the product itself,
which are subject to the limitations set forth in the warranty. Of course,
if there is a defect in the product that causes injury, the manufacturer
may be held liable under the law of products liability.68 Products
liability law has no application to injuries that are not caused by the
product, but instead result from the torts of the independent contractor.69
F. Critique of the Current Law of Vicarious Liability.
As discussed above, one of the biggest problems that the current
model of vicarious liability suffers from is unpredictability and
inconsistency. 70 The determination of a worker's status as an employee
68. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
69. See Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. Winkler, 640 P.2d 216 (Colo. 1982) (holding
that manufacturer will be held liable for physical harm to consumer resulting from
misrepresentation regarding product's uses).
70. John L. Hanks, Franchisor Liability for the Torts of Its Franchisees: The Case
for Substituting Liability as a Guarantor for the Current Vicarious Liability, 24 OKLA.
CiTY U. L. REv. 1 (1999); King, supra note 2, at 462; Gary Schwartz, The Hidden and
Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739 (1996).
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or independent contractor is unclear as a result of the application of
multi-factor tests that often reflect competing pressures that are totally
unrelated to the issue of vicarious liability, and instead reflect social
welfare concerns.71 Further, because there are so many exceptions to the
'general rule' of nonliability, even when a worker is deemed to be an
independent contractor, companies cannot reasonably predict whether
they will be held vicariously liable for the acts of independent
contractors. Companies can be sure of one thing: there is at least a risk
that they will be held liable for the acts of another company. Our legal
system should foster accurate risk assessment, not indeterminate risk
assessment. Where risk assessment is inflated, companies are incent-
ivized to take more care and resources to prevent risk than would
otherwise be warranted. This imposes a cost without a benefit.72
To the extent that the current model of liability advances the goals
of deterrence and compensation, it does so inefficiently or not at all.
Holding the hiring company liable when it does not have control over
the acts of another party does not advance deterrence. If the hiring
company is negligent in selecting the contractor, the company will
already be held liable. 7' Thus, the incentive for the hiring company to
exercise care where it can actually do so already exists. Imposing lia-
bility for acts that it cannot control does not improve safety or advance
deterrence. Further, holding the hiring company liable may actually
reduce the level of care that is exercised by the independent contractor
by deflecting some responsibility away from the independent contractor.
The only real goal that is advanced by holding the hiring company
and the independent contractor liable may be compensation. But even
when compensation goals are legitimately served, the goal of compen-
sation can be more efficiently achieved by imposing only secondary
liability in the event the independent contractor lacks assets. In our
current system of liability, the hiring company may be sued and held
liable, even though the independent contractor has assets to cover the
losses.
There may, however, also be a hidden cost to imposing even
71. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common
Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1285, 1305 (2001) (stating that it is "socially
expedient to spread and distribute throughout the community the inevitable losses
occasioned by injuries to employees engaged in industry").
72. See, e.g., King, supra note 2, at 469-76.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1964).
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secondary liability. Any form of vicarious liability may disincentivize
the use of independent contractors which may result in an inefficient
allocation of resources. Compensation goals may come at the cost of
efficiency. To the extent that indemnity and insurance are available, the
disincentive can be somewhat ameliorated. Further, this disincentive to
using independent contractors may be acceptable because innocent
victims should be compensated. In some circumstances, however, that
conclusion may not follow. Serving the goal of compensation may
actually undermine deterrence when there is privity between the
tortfeasor and the victim because it may encourage carelessness, as will
be examined in Part IV of this Article.
At a minimum, this analysis suggests at least two things: (1) the
multi-factor "status" tests for evaluating whether a worker is an
employee or an independent contractor should not be used as a basis for
determining whether to impose vicarious liability on companies; and (2)
the courts should adopt a rule of vicarious liability that is not riddled
with exceptions. Aside from the "apparent agency" doctrine, the other
exceptions are unprincipled and do not advance predictability, an
important goal that allows companies to make effective operational
choices about who they hire. Even as to the "apparent agency" doctrine,
the scope of its application is not always clear, resulting in unnecessary
litigation as to the scope of the exception.
III. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES HAVE BEEN ADVANCED FOR
DETERMINING WHEN VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS IS APPROPRIATE
Faced with the unpredictability that permeates the current law of
vicarious liability, and concerned that the many exceptions swallow the
"general rule" of nonliability, scholars have struggled to find an alter-
native theory for determining when, if ever, a company should be held
liable for the acts of independent contractors. " While scholars generally
74. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 2, at 335 & nn.244-46 (2001); Clement L. Hyland
& Laura A. Quigley, Determination of Employee Status: Right to Control v. Economic
Reality-Is There a Difference? 61-JAN FLA. B.J. 43 (1987); King, supra note 2, at
462; Jane M. McFetridge & Grace Hwang Lee, When Are Supervisors Personally
Liable for Employment Law Violations?, 92 ILL. B.J. 628 (2004); Mosley & Walter,
supra note 16, at 613,
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concur that the "employee status" test is unsatisfactory,75 no consensus
has emerged as to an alternative test or theory.
A. Control Theory.
Some commentators advocate abandoning the multi-factor
"employee status" test to return to a unitary "control" test in which the
determinative factor is the level of control that is exerted by the
company over the 'details' of the work, as opposed to the 'final' results
that are obtained.7 6 Under this theory, vicarious liability is not imposed
for the acts of a worker who is hired to accomplish the end result (e.g.,
plumbing that works), and who is not instructed in any manner regarding
the details of how to accomplish the result. In contrast, a company that
has a "right to control the physical conduct or method of doing the work
of the person who causes an injury" will be held vicariously liable. 77
The underlying rationale for imposing liability in this circumstance is
that because the company is in control, it is in the best position to
prevent or reduce injuries. Although the liability is considered to be vi-
carious, the underlying implication is that there was some "fault" in
failing to supervise the work appropriately.78
As discussed in connection with the "retained control" exception, to
the extent that the hiring company has negligently exercised control, it
should be held directly liable, not vicariously liable. Otherwise, using a
"control test" to impose vicarious liability does little to advance predict-
75. See Carlson, supra note 2; Mosley & Walter, supra note 16.
76. Mosley &Walter, supra note 16, at 632; see also Michael R. Flynn, Note, The
Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A Critique, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 89, 105
(1993) (suggesting liability be based on a "greater control" test). See also Dawson v.
Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc., 890 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the
"pivotal" question in determining whether a salesperson is an employee, as opposed to
an independent contractor, is whether the company has the "right to control the means
and manner of the service, as distinguished from controlling the ultimate results of the
service").
77. John Dwight Ingram, Vicarious Liability of the Employer of an Apparent
Servant, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 19 (2005); see also Moser v. Texas Trailer
Corp., 623 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that company did not exercise "control"
over independent contractor shipper, and therefore was not liable); Murrell v. Goertz,
597 P.2d 1223 (Okla. App. 1979) (holding that newspaper was not liable for acts of
newspaper carrier because newspaper did not control details of work); Carlson, supra
note 2, at 340;.
78. See Dalley, supra note 65, at 535-36.
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ability. Courts looked to additional factors beyond "control" because
they found that the element of "control" was not always a satisfactory
proxy for determining when liability should attach. In part, this is
because it is often difficult to "measure" control because, as one
commentator notes, "control does not exist in discrete, measurable and
comparable units."79 It is difficult to determine ahead of time whether a
company has exercised "too much" control, thereby subjecting the
company to vicarious liability. Further, the problem of how you
measure control, and which task is the focus of the inquiry, makes all the
difference in determining the final outcome regarding whether the hiring
company has exerted sufficient control to impose vicarious liability. If
the "control test" is construed narrowly, so that the inquiry is whether
the hiring company exercised control over the very conduct that caused
the injury, then liability is less likely to attach to the hiring company. 0
If the mere "right to exercise control" is used as the test, liability will
more likely attach. 8 ' Franchisers frequently face this problem because
trademark owners typically exert a fair amount of control to ensure their
brand quality is preserved. Nevertheless, this type of control rarely ex-
tends to control over day-to-day operations typical of an "employee.
8 2
If the mere "right to exercise control" is used as the test, franchisors will
often be held liable. If instead, the determination is whether the fran-
chisor exercised control over the conduct that led to the injury, vicarious
liability will attach less frequently. Unless the scope of the control test
is well established in advance, predictability will not be advanced.
Similarly, distinguishing between control over "details," as opposed
to "end results" depends on how the task is defined. As one commen-
tator suggests, if building a house is the stated end goal, directing details
relating to plumbing may be deemed as exercising control, resulting in a
determination that the plumbing subcontractor is an employee of the
general contractor.8 3
79. Id. See also Ingram, supra note 77, at 19 (noting that "it is sometimes
suggested that the control test is cumbersome to apply, producing contrasting results in
cases with quite similar facts").
80. See King, supra note 2, at 435 (noting that "courts often distinguish
franchisor's setting of standards, which protects the uniformity, quality, and good name
of the franchisor's products and services from the control over the day-to-day
operations of the franchisees").
81. See id. at 429-36 (discussing the potential application of the control test).
82. See, e.g., id. at 432-33.
83. Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95
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The "control test" does little to advance predictability or
consistency. Deterrence is advanced, in theory, by holding the hiring
company liable where it has control. Yet if the scope of the test is
defined too broadly, the hiring company will be held liable for conduct
even though it lacks control.14 Compensation goals may also fall short
when there is no "control" exerted over the independent contractor. In
that circumstance, innocent third parties will be left to seek recovery
from the independent contractor, and may be left with no remedy if the
contractor's assets fall short.
B. Enterprise Liability Theory.
A more prevalent alternative theory advanced by scholars is
"Enterprise Liability." 5 Under that theory, companies are held liable
for the acts of independent contractors that they hire to the same extent
as employees, without regard to their status one way or another. 86 The
rationale behind Enterprise Liability is that "the enterprise will reap the
fruits and profits from the activities of those acting on its behalf, and
accordingly should bear the burdens created by those activities too. 87
Losses that result from using contractors should be borne by the party
that contracted for the work as an "externality" of doing business so that
the cost of goods fully reflects the costs of production.
1. The Strongest Attribute of Enterprise Liability is its Predictability.
The greatest strength of Enterprise Liability is probably its
MICH. L. REv. 1266 (1997); Carlson, supra note 2, at 340.
84. See, e.g., King, supra note 2, at 430-32.
85. Douglas Brodie, Enterprise Liability: Justifying Vicarious Liability, 27
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (2007); Dalley, supra note 65, at 534-38 (describing
"Enterprise Liability" and offering variant of "Risks and Benefits of the Business"
theory); Simon Deakin, "Enterprise-Risk": The Juridical Nature of the Firm Revisited,
32 INDus. L.J. 97 (2003); Ingram, supra note 77, at 19 (stating that the author finds
enterprise theory liability "very persuasive"); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984); Kristie Tappan,
Note, Medical-Malpractice Reform: Is Enterprise Liability or No-Fault a Better
Reform?, 46 B.C. L. REv. 1095 (2005) (defining enterprise liability in context of
medical industry as shifting liability away from individual healthcare providers to
hospitals, but retaining the requirement of negligence).
86. See Ingram, supra note 77, at 19.
87. Id.
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predictability. Predictability is an important touchstone of any system of
vicarious liability. If the liability system is unpredictable, companies
will not exercise the level of care that is appropriate. Exercising "too
little" care is obviously undesirable. Alternatively, exercising "too
much" care is also problematic because it unnecessarily increases the
cost of goods without advancing safety. If a company incorrectly as-
sesses that the risk of liability is higher than it actually is, it may obtain
additional insurance, which comes at additional cost, even though the
company does not actually bear such risk and even though the Company
cannot control the conduct of the contractors that create the risk.
Enterprise Liability theory eliminates "guesswork" because the rule
provides that the hiring company will always be liable for the acts of
independent contractors, instead of only being liable if an exception to
the general rule of nonliability applies, or if the worker is deemed to be
an employee. Predictability allows companies to more accurately assess
the "true" cost of using independent contractors, and to make
adjustments by either (1) shifting work to their own employees, over
whom they have more control; or (2) increasing the price of the
company's goods so that the burden of liability is spread to all
consumers of the product; or (3) by requiring the contractor to
indemnify the hiring company and/or obtain requisite levels of insurance
to cover any loss. This too will distribute the cost to consumers because
the cost of the contractor's services will increase, which will be
distributed to the contractor's clients, including the hiring company.
There is also a significant benefit of reducing unnecessary costs of
litigation. The issue of the worker's status as an employee or inde-
pendent contractor is eliminated, as is litigation regarding whether one
of the exceptions to nonliability applies. Instead, the litigation focuses
on whether the worker was negligent and the amount of the damages.
2. Compensation Goals are Advanced but Deterrence
May be Somewhat Dampened.
Enterprise Liability theory furthers compensation goals because
having two sources of recovery increases the likelihood that the victim
will be made whole. The impact on deterrence is less clear, however,
and may actually be somewhat dampened. One claimed benefit of
Enterprise Liability theory is that it provides a strong incentive on the
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hiring company to exercise great care in selecting the independent
contractor, which furthers the "public interest., 88 In truth, that incentive
already exists because the hiring company can be held directly liable if it
is negligent in selecting the contractor. Holding the hiring company
liable even though it lacks control over independent contractors does
little to advance deterrence. Further, it may somewhat lessen the
incentive of independent contractors to take care because liability will be
assessed against the hiring company. Nevertheless, because the hiring
company will likely seek reimbursement from the independent
contractor, the contractor's incentive to use due care is still advanced.
On the other hand, if the contractor has insufficient assets, it may simply
take on more risk than is otherwise warranted because, at the end of the
day, it may not in fact bear liability for that risk.89 On balance,
Enterprise Liability may have a slight dampening effect on deterrence,
but significant benefit in advancing predictability and compensation
goals. Despite these advantages, Enterprise Liability has some
significant shortcomings.
3. Criticisms of Enterrise Liability.
Enterprise Liability Departs from the Typical American Model of Fault.
One criticism of Enterprise Liability is that, on its face, it seems
"unfair" that the liability exposure of a company should be the same
regardless of whether the tortfeasor is an employee, or instead an
independent contractor. The typical model of tort liability in the United
States is to hold companies liable only when the company actually bears
some fault. Theorists who espouse Enterprise Liability try to sidestep
this problem by suggesting that the company can require an indemnity
from the independent contractor. 90 In fact, this does not fully solve the
problem because an indemnity is only beneficial so long as the
indemnifying party has sufficient assets to cover the liability. Putting
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 83, at 1291-94.
90. Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors' Liability When Franchisees Are Apparent
Agents: An Empirical and Policy Analysis of "Common Knowledge" About
Franchising, 20 HOFsTRA L. REv. 609, 667 n.274 (1992) (proposing that franchisors be
jointly and severally liable with their franchisee, but that the franchisor have a right to
seek indemnity).
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this aside, there is another, far more serious criticism, which can be
leveled at Enterprise Liability theory. This criticism is the same one that
infects the many "exceptions" that currently riddle the "general rule" of
nonliability for acts of independent contractors, that is, imposing
vicarious liability on the hiring company for acts of independent
contractors may disincentivize the use of independent contractors,
resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources. The only difference is
that Enterprise Liability theory goes that much further in holding the
company liable for all acts of independent contractors, regardless of the
category of activity, whereas the "exceptions" to the general rule of
nonliability only impose liability on the company when one of the
"exceptions" applies. 9'
Enterprise Liability May Disincentivize Use of Independent Contractors,
Resultina in an Inefficient Allocation of Resources.
Enterprise Liability may be economically inefficient to the extent
that it disincentivizes the use of independent contractors. As a general
matter, a company has the most control over its own employees. To the
extent that the exercise of "due care" lessens the potential for injury, an
employer can closely supervise its employees and devise protocols to
reduce the potential for injury. If work is outsourced to an independent
contractor, the company can no longer exercise that control. Instead, the
independent contractor presumably undertakes the role of exercising due
care. If a company is held liable for the acts of independent contractors
to the same extent as its own employees, the company may rationally
have some incentive to simply use its own employees, where it can exert
the most control. 92
Even if the hiring company obtains an indemnity from the
independent contractor, this will not fully overcome the disincentive that
exists because an indemnity necessarily adds additional risk, depending
on whether the independent contractor has sufficient assets, not only at
the time the parties execute the agreement, but thereafter, for the
duration of the contract. If the independent contractor can obtain
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410-29; see Keating, supra note 83, at
1291-94 (debating the effect of enterprise theory on efficiency).
92. Disincentives to use independent contractors would be overcome in some
instances when, for example, the hiring company knows the area requires special
"expertise" that only the independent contractor can offer.
2009 WHEN CONTRACT SHOULD 207
PREEMPT TORT REMEDIES
insurance, this may do a better job in reducing the disincentive to use
independent contractors, but even insurance is subject to many
exclusions. Further, insurance may be unavailable as a practical matter,
as evidenced by shipping interests following the Exxon Valdez
disaster.9'
A desirable liability model is one that is predictable and serves the
"twin" goals of tort law: deterrence and compensation. An important
addition to these goals, however, is that tort law should also improve, or
at least not hinder, economic efficiency. While Enterprise Liability
brings a high level of predictability and does a good job in advancing the
goal of compensating those who are injured, it does a marginal job of
satisfying the goal of deterrence, and it does a poor job of advancing
economic efficiency.
IV. CONTRACT PREEMPTION THEORY OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
This article advances an alternative theory of vicarious liability: the
Contract Preemption Theory ("Contract Preemption"). Contract Pre-
emption divides torts into two categories. The first category involves
injury to a third party who entered into a contract relationship with the
independent contractor, and was ultimately injured as a result. The
second category of torts involves injury to a third party who has no prior
relationship with either the independent contractor or the company that
hired the independent contractor. A classic example of the first category
is a purchaser who buys a product from an independent sales
representative who intentionally or negligently misrepresents the
product's capabilities. Another example is someone who suffers injury
from the operator of an independent franchise restaurant. 94 Typical torts
involve claims for food poisoning or premises liability based on falling
due to a slippery floor, as an example.9'
The Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster is an example of the second
93. See Mitchell F. Dolin, An Overview of the Exxon Valdez Insurance Coverage
Dispute, 10 INT'L INS. L. REv. 313, 313-17 (1997).
94. See, e.g., Miller v. McDonald's Corp., 945 P.2d 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding franchisor vicariously liable for injuries caused to patron by stone in
hamburger).
95. See, e.g., Croteau v. Denny's Rest., Inc., 2002 Mass. App. Div. 81 (2002)
(holding Denny's liable for illness resulting from salmonella poisoning); Gump v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 5 P.3d 407 (Haw. 2000) (finding liability where customer was injured
after slipping on a french fry dropped by another customer).
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category of torts under Contract Preemption.96 Fishermen, or even the
"public at large," suffered from the environmental damage that resulted
from the oil spill. Those tort victims enjoyed no contractual relationship
with the oil carrier. The model of tort liability necessarily should be dif-
ferent in these two very different constructs.
The existing vicarious liability model makes no distinction between
these two categories of torts, nor do scholars who advance alternative
theories of liability. Instead, current models focus solely on the rela-
tionship between the hiring company and the independent contractor, or
they simply focus on compensating the victim. This omits a critical
relationship that may exist between the independent contractor and the
victim that is injured as a result of the independent contractor's tort. To
the extent that those parties shared a contractual relationship, the current
models of tort liability fail to acknowledge it, and more critically, fail to
consider how that relationship impacts deterrence goals. Instead of fo-
cusing solely on compensating the victim, the model of vicarious
liability should also consider whether the companion goal of tort law,
deterrence, is also advanced. The system of liability should encourage
all parties, including the party who enters into a contract with the
independent contractor, as well as the independent contractor and hiring
company, to exercise due care. The current system of tort liability, as
well as the alternative theories that are advanced by scholars,97
encourage carelessness by the tort victim.
A. Vicarious Liability for Torts Involving Contracting Parties.
For torts in the first category involving a party who entered into a
contractual relationship with the independent contractor, that party
should be limited to seeking recovery for their injuries directly from the
independent contractor only. The only condition for this recovery
limitation to apply is that the tort victim must have had clear notice that
he or she was entering into a contract with an independent contractor. In
that circumstance, the victim knew, ahead of time, that he or she was
dealing with a "solo" entity and that if there was a subsequent loss, the
purchaser would have to look to the assets of the independent contractor.
That may be risky behavior, relative to doing business directly with the
company that manufactured the goods, depending on the size and assets
96. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2611-13 (2008).
97. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text.
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of the independent contractor, relative to the hiring company. A typical
example involves companies who use sales agents. Some companies
have sales agents who are employees of the company. The cost of goods
for those companies is necessarily higher, reflecting the overhead of
maintaining a salaried work force of sales employees. In contrast, the
cost of goods for an independent sales contractor may be cheaper
because of the lack of overhead. There may also be some other benefit,
such as ease of access to the goods for traveling sales representatives.
If the buyer chooses to get the benefit of the lower price or the
convenience, instead of paying more by dealing with the manufacturer
directly, it is also appropriate to saddle the buyer with the corresponding
burden of being limited to seeking recovery for any injuries from the
independent contractor (aside from those caused by product defects). So
long as there is adequate notice of the independent contractor's status,
including notice that recourse for any liability can only be satisfied by
the independent contractor, the purchaser is in a position to evaluate
whether to do business with that contractor. The purchaser can invest-
tigate whether the contractor has a solid reputation by checking
references; can consider how long the independent contractor has been
in business; can evaluate whether the contractor has sufficient assets to
satisfy its liabilities; and can inquire if the contractor has insurance,
among other things. If the purchaser chooses not to exercise such care,
that carelessness should not be rewarded, as the current tort system
provides when vicarious liability attaches to the hiring company. The
current system allows the buyer to essentially 'reform' its contract by
substituting the company it had chosen to do business with, with another
company entirely. This is a truly radical transformation that is not
appropriate when the buyer had adequate notice that he or she was
contracting with an independent contractor in which recovery for any
liability would be limited to that independent contractor. This Article
advocates that in this circumstance, contract remedies should preempt
tort recovery. The buyer should be left to seek recourse against the party
that it actually contracted with to do business.
Enterprise Liability theorists frequently tout that, as between two
innocent parties, the tort system should compensate the victim and
require the company that has hired the independent contractor to pay for
the injury, even though that company had no fault, because the company
enjoys a corresponding benefit in selling product through the use of
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independent contractors.98 This premise is flawed because the purchaser
is improperly characterized as an 'innocent' party. The purchaser was
either careless, or otherwise made a calculated determination that due
diligence was not warranted. In either circumstance, the purchaser
should be left to his or her own election. Ultimately, if it is important to
do business with 'a company that stands behind its products,' purchasers
can elect to take their business to companies that have integrated sales
forces, or they can limit their business to independent contractors who
have requisite levels of insurance. Either way, the cost of doing bus-
iness will be reflected in the price of the goods, and efficiency will
promote the desired model of business organization. The twin goals of
tort law will be advanced, but not at the cost of economic efficiency.
1. Compensation and Deterrence Goals are Advanced.
The goal of compensation will be advanced, but not haphazardly, to
any person who is injured regardless of their degree of recklessness.
Purchasers who knowingly do business with independent contractors
will be limited to seeking recovery directly from the independent con-
tractor. If the independent contractor has limited assets, the purchaser
will be left to fend for him or herself.99  That result is actually
appropriate. The wider public should not be forced to bear the cost of
one purchaser's carelessness, as will occur if the hiring company is
forced to bear the cost and ultimately distributes that cost to all
purchasers.
Deterrence, the other goal of tort law, is also better served under
Contract Preemption. Holding the independent contractor directly liable
for its own torts, instead of the company that hired the independent
contractor, furthers the goal of deterrence. To the extent that due care
can be exercised to reduce injuries to third parties as a result of conduct
by the independent contractor, the independent contractor is obviously in
the best position to exercise such care. Imposing liability on the
company that hired the independent contractor, who has the least control
over the independent contractor, does not serve deterrence well, except
to the extent that the hiring company did not exercise care in selecting a
competent independent contractor. In that event, there is no need to
resort to vicarious liability. Rather, the hiring company may be held
98. See Ingram, supra note 77, at 19.
99. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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directly liable for its own negligence in failing to exercise care when
selecting independent contractors.' 00
2. Economic Efficiency is Advanced.
Contract Preemption also advances economic efficiency because
there is no disincentive to using independent contractors. If it is more
efficient for the company to delegate work or even whole parts of the
business (e.g., distribution of product) to independent contractors, the
company can make that election without the tort liability system
unnecessarily burdening that choice. The model of liability should serve
the twin goals of tort law without compromising economic efficiency.
By holding companies liable for the acts of independent contractors to
the same extent as if those contractors were employees, the use of
independent contractors may be disincentivized. The alternative model
of liability that is advanced here eliminates this disincentive by not
imposing liability for the acts of independent contractors in those
circumstances when the independent contractor has entered into an
informed contractual relationship with the buyer. If it is better for a
hiring company to use independent contractors, it will do so. There will
be no inappropriate liability saddling its decision concerning any
contracts in which an independent contractor has executed a contract
with a third party.
3. Predictability is Advanced.
One strength of Contract Preemption is its simplicity. This model
honors the parties' contract by adopting the label that the parties
themselves attach to their relationships. There is no need to delve into
the muddied 'multi-factor' test to determine employee/independent
contractor status. Rather, if the parties designate that the relationship is
that of an independent contractor (both as between the manufacturer and
the contractor and as between the purchaser and the independent
contractor), that will be the end of the inquiry. Where independent
contractor status is clearly designated, the hiring company may not be
held vicariously liable for the acts of the independent contractor.
Contract Preemption's predictability is as robust as that of
Enterprise Liability. There is no place for any of the many exceptions
100. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 71, at 1291-94.
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that currently riddle the "general rule" of nonliability, aside from the
apparent agency doctrine. Apparent agency doctrine has a continuing
place under the Contract Preemption theory of liability because if the
company led the buyer to believe that the independent contractor was an
agent/employee of the company, the company should be saddled with
vicarious liability. Indeed, in that circumstance, notice of the inde-
pendent contractor's status must necessarily have been absent.'0 '
Vicarious liability that attaches under the current apparent agency
exception is nevertheless distinguishable from the model of liability that
is advanced here in two respects. First, the uncertainty regarding the
scope of the apparent agency doctrine is lessened in that a bright line test
is imposed, requiring express notice to the consumer that the consumer
is entering into a contract with an independent contractor. Second, the
current system attaches primary liability on the hiring party, instead of
secondary liability as is advocated here. 1
02
Regarding practicality, in the internet era companies can certainly
take many steps to ensure that the buyer is informed of the status of
independent contractors. The company can include prominent notice on
its website that sales are handled by independent contractors and that the
company is only responsible for product warranties and defects, but
otherwise, recourse for any liability is limited to the independent
contractor. Further, the company can require that the independent
contractor distribute product warranty materials that also include a
prominent notice of the contractor's status, including a provision
requiring that buyers initial such provisions as a prerequisite before any
transactions can be executed with the buyer. Where the company takes
such steps, it should not be held liable for the acts of independent
contractors. Of course, if the company learns that it has hired an incom-
petent or untrustworthy contractor, it must act diligently to fire such
contractor. Otherwise, so long as the company exercises due diligence
and care, it cannot be held liable.
101. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
102. There are limited circumstances in which primary. liability would continue to
apply in the apparent agency context. In particular, if the consumer believes it is
dealing only with the hiring company because the use of the independent contractor is
"invisible" to the consumer, then the consumer would only know to sue the hiring
company. Examples in this category include hospitals that outsource emergency room
doctors, and outsourced workers that are "invisible" to the consumer, such as in the
context of "call centers" that are handled by independent contractors.
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One of the most typical uses of independent contractors is in sales.
Instead of hiring a large force of employees to distribute their products,
with high fixed salary costs, companies hire independent contractors to
sell them. Contractors are often only paid on a commission basis, or
they are paid a relatively low base salary with commissions as
incentives.' °3 Using independent contractors significantly reduces the
company's overhead costs and allows the company to change the size of
its workforce based on demand, cyclical or seasonal needs. Torts that
can arise include potential misrepresentations regarding the product or
opportunity that is presented by the salesperson. A plaintiff may sue in
tort because the duty to accurately represent the product arises
independent of whatever remedies arise under the contract. As an
example, the contract may provide for no product warranties and no
refund right. Nevertheless, the remedy in tort may include rescission
rights, as well as compensation for any physical or property injury.
In reviewing tort cases involving sales representatives, the most
prevalent issue in determining whether vicarious liability will attach to
the hiring company is determining whether apparent agency is
established. If the salesperson issues an invoice to the buyer bearing the
letterhead of the manufacturer, and business cards that state "sales
representative," without disclosing the independent contractor's status,
the buyer may well reasonably believe that the representative is an
employee of the manufacturer. In those circumstances, courts have
imposed vicarious liability on the hiring company.'0 4 If the company
instead requires salespeople to use their own invoices, and business
cards that clearly designate the independent contractors' status,
including a disclosure that any recourse for liability is limited to the
independent contractor, then vicarious liability should not attach under
the Contract Preemption theory advocated here. This result seems ac-
ceptable. Indeed, buyers are typically left with recourse solely against
the entity that the buyer did business with. No further recourse is
available there either. Thus, however "vulnerable" or ignorant the con-
sumer may be, the buyer's recourse is limited in most transactions.
There is no reason to provide the buyer with a "windfall" of being able
103. See, e.g., Amiya K. Basu et al., Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency
Theoretic Perspective, 4 MKTG. Sc. 267, 267-91 (1985).
104. See Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 592 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that company
would be liable for acts of independent contractor because contractor gave appearance
of being an agent of hiring company).
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to go after two companies when independent contractors are involved.
Another typical use of independent contractors is in the context of
franchise operations. Many franchises are "independently owned and
operated." Consumers may or may not appreciate that most franchises
are not owned by the franchisor. Instead, the franchisee simply has a
license to use the trademarks of the company. Often the franchisor im-
poses numerous controls over the franchisee's operations to ensure that
the quality of the product is consistent. The current law of vicarious
liability is inconsistent in the franchise area. Depending on how broadly
"control" is defined, franchisors are sometimes held liable for the torts
of franchisees because of the level of control that franchisors exert over
operations. Other courts do not attach vicarious liability if the tort
involves conduct over which the franchisor did not exercise control.'05
Under Contract Preemption, franchisors would not be held
vicariously liable so long as they took steps to ensure that consumers are
given sufficient notice that franchises are independently owned and
operated and that any liability claims will be limited to the franchisee
only. This could be accomplished by including prominent notices inside
franchise locations. Absent such notice, the franchisor could properly be
held liable. 1
06
Another area in which the use of independent contractors is
increasingly growing is outsourcing. Although a number of companies
have their own operations overseas which staff employees, many
outsourced workers are employees of relatively large overseas inde-
pendent contractors. One example of this has occurred in the medical
care industry. Beginning in the 1990s, there was a shortage of radiology
technicians in the United States. As a result, medical care providers
began using highly trained radiologists in India and other countries
overseas to evaluate x-ray, MRI and other diagnostic films. Aside from
providing needed expertise, the salary for even highly trained diagnostic
technicians outside the United States (who typically obtained their
105. See Bahadirli v. Domino's Pizza, 873 F. Supp. 1528 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (holding
Domino's not liable for discrimination tort alleged against store manager); Hyde v.
Schlotzsky's, Inc., 561 S.E.2d 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding franchisor not
vicariously liable for patron's Hepatitis A claim because franchisor did not exercise
control over day-to-day operations); Gabler v. Holder and Smith, Inc., 11 P.3d 1269
(Okla. App. 2000) (holding franchisor not liable in connection with employee's
wrongful discharge claim because franchisor did not exercise day-to-day control);
Emerson, supra note 90; Flynn, supra note 76; King, supra note 2.
106. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing apparent authority).
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education in the United States) was as much as a third the cost of
comparably educated technicians in the United States. Another advan-
tage results from time differences. Radiology data can be sent to
technicians in the evening, with the results being available the next day
when the working day resumes in the United States. Tort liability typ-
ically arises in this context as a result of negligent or missed
diagnoses. 1
07
The use of outsourcing in this context, and many others, such as
"call centers", is almost always "invisible" to the consumer. The con-
sumer has no idea that an important function is being outsourced
overseas using independent contractors. Rather, after the data is
summarized by the outsourced technician, the results are sent to the
United States medical care provider, who then follows up with the
patient as needed. 10 8 Under Contract Preemption, the "consumer" be-
lieves that he or she is only dealing with the United States care provider.
As such, the outsourced radiologist acts as an agent (although not an
apparent one) on behalf of the provider. In that context, the hiring
company would be held vicariously liable because there is no notice to
the victim that the diagnostic service is being performed by an
independent contractor. A similar result would apply to use of any
outsourced worker where the use is "invisible" to the consumer. Unless
the hiring company took steps to advise the buyer that services are being
provided by an independent contractor, with liability being limited to the
independent contractor as to those services, the buyer would believe it is
dealing with the hiring company alone. Regarding this category of torts,
it is appropriate to impose vicarious liability in the same manner as for
torts where the tortfeasor enjoys no contractual relationship with the
victim.
107. Archie A. Alexander, American Diagnostic Radiology Moves Offshore: Is This
Field Riding the Internet Wave into a Regulatory Abyss?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 199
(2007); Brad L. Peterson, When and Why Companies Use Onshore and Offshore
Outsourcing Arrangements, in KEYS TO OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING 2006:
PROTECTING CRITICAL BUSINESS FUNCTIONS, at 17 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series 2006); Darya V. Pollak, Note,
"I'm Calling My Lawyer... In India!": Ethical Issues in International Legal Out-
sourcing, 11 UCLA J. INT'L. L. & FOREIGN AFF. 99 (2006); Frank P. Fedor & Allen M.
Carlson, Outsourcing: Opportunities for Better Performance and Compliance (Ass'n
of Health Lawyers, Inst. on Medicare & Medicaid Payment Issues, Paper No.
P03259817, 1998).
108. See Alexander, supra note 107.
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Under the Contract Preemption theory of tort liability that is
advocated by this Article, tort liability for injuries in the first category
should be strictly limited to the actual tortfeasor, the independent
contractor, as long as there is adequate notice of the independent
contractor's status. Where notice of the independent contractor's status
is lacking, the liability should be the same as for category two, described
below.
B. Vicarious Liability for Torts Where the Tortfeasor
Enjoys No Contractual Relationship with the Victim.
In the second category involving injuries to third parties who enjoy
no relationship with either the independent contractor or the hiring
company, the tort liability model necessarily must be different. In this
circumstance, there really is an entirely innocent party. In this second
category of torts, the actual tortfeasor should still bear primary liability.
If the independent contractor has insufficient assets, however, then the
hiring company should bear the burden of making up the shortfall. In
the current system, when vicarious liability attaches haphazardly either
because the contractor is deemed to be an employee, or because one of
the exceptions to the "general rule" of nonliability is deemed to apply,
the liability is "joint and several," in that the plaintiff may sue one or
both of the parties, and collect against either.' 09 In addition to the un-
certainty that pervades the law, the system of 'joint and several' liability
is inefficient. Instead, the hiring company should bear secondary
liability that only attaches if the assets of the independent contractor are
insufficient.
Contract still has an important role for this second category of torts.
If the risks of injury by the independent contractor are high, but its assets
are low, the company can require, in its contract with the independent
contractor, that the contractor obtain requisite levels of insurance. In
this way, the company can use contract law to limit its tort liability -
another variant of the theory of contract preempting tort liability. If the
risks are low, the company need not mandate that its independent con-
tractors obtain insurance. Alternatively, the hiring company can decide
that it should handle the work itself by using its own employees. Again,
under this theory the twin goals of tort law are better achieved, although
at some cost to economic efficiency, as will be discussed below.
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 13.
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1. Compensation and Deterrence Goals are Advanced.
Contract Preemption achieves compensation goals in two ways:
first, by forcing the independent contractor to pay for its negligence, and
second, by requiring the hiring company to make up any shortfall. This
is an equitable result because the company bears some "fault" in not
requiring the independent contractor to obtain insurance, or otherwise in
"accepting" the risk of exposure, much like the purchaser who has notice
that it is dealing with an independent contractor in the first category of
torts. "0 This is an improvement over Enterprise Liability, which holds
the hiring company liable even if the independent contractor has
sufficient assets to compensate for the loss. Unnecessary transactional
costs are thereby avoided. In the current system, if the hiring company
is held liable for the acts of the independent contractor, that company
will then have to seek indemnity from the independent contractor. There
are times when the independent contractor will have sufficient assets to
satisfy the loss. If the hiring company only has secondary liability, and
the independent contractor has sufficient assets, no further "transaction"
involving the hiring company will be necessary. A rule that at least has
the possibility of a "single payor" is more efficient.
The Contract Preemption theory as to this second category of torts
involving injuries to third parties who enjoy no relationship with either
the hiring party or the independent contractor is also superior to the cur-
rent system of liability. Under the current system, liability is uncertain,
with the plaintiff having to prove either that the contractor was really a
de facto employee, or alternatively, that one of the exceptions to the
general rule of nonliability applies. Under Contract Preemption, there is
liability, but only secondary liability in the event the independent
contractor lacks sufficient assets.
Holding the actual tortfeasor liable better serves the goal of
deterrence because the tortfeasor is in the best position to exercise care
and to respond to the "incentive" of being exposed to liability for harm
that it causes. Holding the hiring company secondarily liable does not
advance deterrence, but it also does not detract from it, unlike Enterprise
Liability, because the tortfeasor is at least held primarily liable.
110. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text.
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2. There May be Some Loss of Economic Efficiency
But it is Offset by Compensation Goals.
Regarding the second category of torts, imposing liability sec-
ondarily on the hiring company does result in some potential loss of
economic efficiency. When privity is lacking between the contractor
and the injured party, the hiring company will be saddled with vicarious
liability in those instances in which the independent contractor lacks
sufficient assets or insurance, even though the company lacks control
over the acts of independent contractors. This does introduce some
disincentive to using independent contractors. Nevertheless, in this
circumstance, compensation goals outweigh concerns of economic
efficiency because the injured party is truly innocent, and should not
have to bear the loss. The hiring company benefits from use of con-
tractors and therefore it is appropriate for it to pay for the loss if the
independent contractor lacks sufficient assets. In the first category of
torts, while the hiring company also benefits from the use of contractors,
so too does the buyer. It is equitable for the benefit and risk to be borne
by the buyer, so long as the buyer is an informed contracting party.
Doing so encourages the buyer's exercise of due care.
In the second category of torts, Contract Preemption is similar to
Enterprise Liability theory except that liability for the hiring company is
secondary. As stated above, Enterprise Liability theory imposes some
additional transaction costs because it requires the hiring company to
seek reimbursement from the independent contractor instead of having
the contractor pay for its liability directly. Under Contract Preemption,
reimbursement is unnecessary when the independent contractor's assets
are sufficient to compensate the victim. When the contractor's assets are
insufficient, reimbursement would be unavailing. Enterprise Liability
theory also makes no distinction between the two categories of torts,
whereas under the Contract Preemption theory, the hiring company is
only held liable when there is no privity between the contractor and the
victim, and then only secondarily.
3. Predictability is Advanced.
The liability model advanced here is relatively predictable, even
regarding the second category of torts, because the hiring company can
evaluate the potential risk that the independent contractor will injure
unrelated third parties, and can also evaluate whether the independent
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contractor has sufficient assets or insurance to compensate those who are
injured. This is far superior to the current model in which it is uncertain
when vicarious liability will attach. Significant litigation costs are
avoided in not having to litigate the threshold question of whether the
individual is an employee or independent contractor or whether one of
the exceptions applies. Instead, the company will know that it will be
held liable, but only if the independent contractor lacks sufficient assets
to cover the liability. This model is superior to "Control Theory" and
"Enterprise Liability" because it better advances the goals of
compensation and deterrence with greater economic efficiency.
V. CONCLUSION
The theory advanced in this Article is designated the "Contract
Preemption" model of liability because contract effectively preempts tort
remedies in the first category of torts by cutting off tort recovery where
there is privity. In the second category of torts, contract still has an
important role to play as between the hiring company and the
independent contractor. If the risks of injury by the independent
contractor are high, but its assets are low, the hiring company can
require, in its contract with the independent contractor, that the
contractor obtain requisite levels of insurance. In this way, the company
can use contract law to limit its tort liability - another variant of the
theory of contract preempting tort liability. Under this model of tort
liability, as opposed to the current model of vicarious liability, or the
alternative "Control" or "Enterprise Theory" models, the twin goals of
tort law, deterrence and compensation, are better achieved, without as
much compromise to economic efficiency.
Notes & Observations
